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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the effects of introducing the electronic trading system (EBS) 
on the foreign exchange market, the biggest financial market in the world where trading 
occurs through many dealers. We find that increasing transparency leads to an increase in 
informational efficiency, an important aspect of market quality. However, informed 
dealers are found to quote less aggressively in the more transparent market. Overall, we 
conclude that semi-transparency raises market efficiency in general, but that it is the 
uninformed dealers who benefit more from this increased efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the world with a 
daily turnover of $US 3.2 trillion.1 It is a typical dealership market where dealers around 
the world compete with each other for customers. For inter-dealer trading, the dealers 
also trade with each other in order to share the risk of holding unbalanced currency 
inventories, and to speculate. This market’s institutional arrangement differs from that of 
a centralized auction market (such as the New York Stock Exchange), where individuals 
known as specialists make the market and coordinate the trading process.  
Transparency is a key aspect of any financial market. The main idea of market 
microstructure studies is that information aggregation in the market leads to price 
discovery. For the foreign exchange market, full transparency includes revealing the limit 
order book and best offer price pre-trade, and transaction price and quantity post-trade. 
Traditionally, the foreign exchange market has relied on bilateral phone-based trading 
platform, in which access to the market information is very limited. Two main electronic 
systems, the Reuters System and the Electronic Brokering System, were introduced in 
04/1992 and 10/1993 respectively. The new systems reveal only the offer price before 
trade and transaction price after trade, and account for most of the transactions in the 
market. In this sense, the new electronic trading systems transformed the foreign 
exchange market from almost opaque to semi-transparent. As the EBS is the primary 
liquidity source for EUR/USD (DEM/USD before 1999), the effect of EBS on the market 
should be more significant than that of Reuters, which has been confirmed by Ding and 
Hiltrop (2009). Thus, this paper only focuses on the EBS, and would consider only 
10/1993 as when the electronic system was introduced. 
                                                        
1 BIS triennial survey, 2008. 
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Dealers, the players of the market, are usually classified as big (informed) dealers 
and small (uninformed) dealers. Big dealers, such as big banks, possess relative 
information advantage because of their market power and connections with insiders. 
Small dealers, who could even be individuals, obviously lack the same information 
sources. Intuitively, in a completely transparent market, informed dealers would hesitate 
to trade. This is because dealers reveal their known information while trading, and big 
dealers do not want to lose their information advantage. On the other hand, in a 
completely opaque market, uninformed dealers will be taken advantage of and are thus 
unwilling to trade as well. Both extremes impede market liquidity and result in less 
trading activities. A trade-off exists between transparency and market quality, and some 
semi-transparency level should be the optimal. By examining the impact of the electronic 
trading systems on the foreign exchange market, we will be able to ascertain whether the 
change from opacity to semi-transparency has indeed increased market efficiency. No 
research to date has done such an empirical test, thus our paper contributes to the 
literature by providing the first investigation on a semi-transparency event on a dealership 
market. 
We find that the information efficiency increased after the system was introduced, 
by testing through first-order return autocorrelation. We also determine the impact on the 
big and small dealer groups by measuring the relative contributions of each dealer group 
to the price discovery process, and find that big dealers quoted relatively less 
aggressively after the system was introduced. Overall, we conclude that the semi-
transparency raises market efficiency in general, but that it is the uninformed dealers who 
benefit more from this increased efficiency. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
survey of the literature; Section 3 introduces in detail the data we use in the study; 
Section 4 tests the first and second hypotheses above, analyzes the results and performs 
additional robustness tests; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Theoretical studies on the dealership market lean towards semi-transparency. 
Biais (1993) predicts that pre-trade transparency increases both market efficiency and 
liquidity. Lyons (1996) suggests that the disclosure of order flow will make informed 
dealers lose their information advantage, thus these dealers would hesitate to trade, which 
decreases market liquidity. He argues that semi-transparency should be optimal for 
market liquidity. Naik, Nueberger and Viswanathan (1999) provide another trade-off 
between transparency and market liquidity. They show that greater transparency can 
reduce inventory holding costs, but increase price revision risk. The nondisclosure of the 
first-stage trade details allows the market maker who receives the order first to profit 
from the learned information. 
Existing empirical results are mixed, partly because most of these studies focus on 
full transparency markets. In the NASDAQ, Harris and Schultz (1997) find that in the 
anonymous Small Order Execution System, market makers show wider bid-ask spreads 
compared with the regular non-anonymous dealer markets. Such a finding suggests that 
increasing identity transparency increases market liquidity. Chung and Chuwonganant 
(2009) examine how the introduction of SuperMontage, which increases pre-trade trade 
transparency by displaying the limit order book, affects the NASDAQ. They find the 
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transparency change improves market and execution quality. In bonds market, which is 
another dealership market, Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) find 
significant reductions in institutional execution costs after the initiation of the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) reporting system which increases post-trade 
transparency. Hendershott and Jones (2005) study a change to a less transparent trading 
system at Island, an Electronic Communications Network (ECN). After stopping 
displaying its limit order book in its most liquid products to all market participants, the 
Island is found to have higher trading costs and loses market share. In contrast, Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) show that except for very large trades, spreads on bonds 
whose prices become more transparent decline relative to bonds that experience no 
change in transparency.  
Many other studies focus on auction market. The results are inconclusive. For 
example, Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) examine the effect of increasing pre-trade 
transparency by introducing OpenBook service on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), which reveals limit order book in the market and hence increases pre-trade order 
transparency. They show that greater pre-trade transparency led to higher liquidity and 
greater informational efficiency of price. In contrast, Gemmill (1996) finds no evidence 
of liquidity change when the London Stock Exchange reduces post-trade transparency by 
delaying the publication of prices for block trades. The previous discussion on the 
difference between auction and dealership markets—mainly, the absolute information 
advantage of specialists, and smaller degree of competition for information in auction 
market, versus the decentralized nature and greater competition for information found in 
dealership market—would shed light on the different results obtained in the auction 
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market. It is also for this reason that we base our predictions along those of dealership 
market studies. 
The literature surveyed above paints the general picture of a trade-off between 
transparency and market quality in the foreign exchange market. Specifically, the 
advantage of full and prompt information disclosure is to lower the costs of trading for 
uninformed dealers. The main disadvantage is that informed market participants would 
hesitate to trade, so that market liquidity is hurt. I will contribute to the literature by 
conducting the first empirical study on semi-transparency in a dealership market. The 
event we study is the introduction of the electronic trading systems that changed the 
foreign exchange market from almost opaque to semi-transparent. The lack of semi-
transparency study on dealership market distinguishes our work from the rest. 
Furthermore, most of the existing studies do not investigate how different market 
participants are impacted by the change in market transparency. As we saw earlier, 
related studies present somewhat mixed results on the impact of semi-transparency, and 
suggest that greater transparency benefits uninformed dealers at the expense of informed 
dealers. We therefore propose the following two null hypotheses: 
1. Semi-transparency (pre-trade quote transparency and post-trade price transparency) 
does not affect market efficiency. 
2. The impact of semi-transparency is the same for informed dealers and uninformed 
dealers. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 The ideal data for our tests should contain real transaction data that cover periods 
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before and after the system was introduced. However, the electronic transaction data 
currently available, such as the popular ones from the Electronic Brokering System used 
in many recent studies, do not have dealer identifiers with each transaction, so that the 
impact on different dealers cannot be tested (that is, we would not be able to test 
Hypothesis 2). Another restriction is that real transaction data before 1992 are difficult to 
obtain. Therefore, we use indicative data provided by Olsen Financial. Several studies, 
such as Goodhart et. al. (1996) as well as Chen and Phylaktis (2009), show that the real 
data and indicative data are almost identical, so we are assured that using indicative data 
will not fundamentally affect the reliability of our results. Lastly, neither indicative nor 
real data have transaction volumes. We follow the convention of previous studies, such as 
Kaul and Sapp (2009), to use quoting frequency as a proxy for transaction volume. 
Goodhart et al. (1996), Chen and Phylaktis (2009), and Danielsson and Payne (2002) also 
show that indicative quotes frequency and real frequency are highly consistent. 
Our data cover all months between 10/1992 – 04/1994. They can be divided into 
quote data and news data. For each month, the quote data consist of tick-by-tick spot 
quotes for the Deutsche Mark-U.S. Dollar exchange rate. The bid and ask prices, the date, 
and the time rounded to the nearest second are also provided for each quote. In addition, 
each quote has a unique Reuters identifier which specifies the quoting dealer and their 
location. Before 10/1993, the identifiers are numbers. For instance, code 0043 refers to 
the CitiBank in New York City. After 10/1993, the identifiers are 4-letter codes. For 
instance, CITN is the code for the CitiBank in New York City. We use this information to 
identify the most active participants in the market. Table 5 shows the top 10 dealers 
ranked on quote frequency throughout our sample period. Following other studies such as 
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Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), we exclude weekends and holidays, because of their 
low and inconsistent trading activity. We define weekends as extending from 20:00 GMT 
Friday evening (the close of North American markets) until 23:59 GMT Sunday evening 
(when trading commences in the Far East). 
There are numerous data points for each month. Table 1 reports descriptive 
statistics for quote frequency at 5-minute intervals and raw data of all midquotes. Figure 
1 displays daily average midquotes (the average of bid and ask prices), midquote variance, 
and quote frequency for big and small dealers separately2. Note that because there are a 
number of missing observations in 10/1993, the data do display some discontinuity for 
that month. The midquotes of big and small dealers, as shown on the first panel of the 
figure, show almost no difference. This provides a good grounding in our information 
share estimation in Section 4.2, where we assume that big and small dealers’ quotes 
should not differ substantially. The variance plot shows that big dealers’ variance is 
slightly smaller than small dealers. Also, we can see from the figure that variance 
decreases, whereas quote frequency increases, after the EBS was introduced. Midquote 
variances and quote frequencies correspond to market volatility and trading volume, 
respectively, which are two important aspects of market quality. Although we will not 
conduct specific tests, the decrease in midquote variances and the increase in quote 
frequency suggest an improved market quality following the introduction of the system. 
To test news effect in the different trading systems, we also obtained news data 
extracted from Reuters AAMM headline news during the same period. Each news 
observation includes the date, the time rounded to the nearest second, and a brief sentence 
                                                        
2 Here, big dealers are defined as top 5 dealers based on their monthly quoting frequencies. In subsequent sections this 
definition will be changed. 
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of the news content. According to Almeida et al (1998) and Anderson et al (2007), 
various macroeconomic news announcements are found to have significant impact on 
dealers’ quotes. We use a classification similar to theirs and include all news regarding 
interest rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate, income, spending, retail sales, 
consumption, GDP, durable goods consumption, payroll, industrial production, CPI and 
PPI as significant news. Table 3 shows the frequency of the major news in each month, 
and Figure 2 displays the daily frequency of news (all news) arrivals throughout the 
period. Both the table and figure show that news frequency increases significantly since 
late 1993, probably due to the stock market downturn caused by the Peso crisis and 
tightening monetary policy in the US market during the period. 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1 Information Efficiency Test 
The basic theory underlying the first hypothesis is the efficient-market hypothesis, 
which asserts that financial markets are “informationally efficient.” This means that 
prices of traded securities reflect all available information. The foreign exchange market 
is the largest financial market in the world in terms of transaction volumes, and the traded 
security is the currency, with the price being the quotes submitted by different dealers at 
different points in time. Because information is the key in ensuring that the market is 
efficient, it is natural to expect that the more easily information is transmitted among 
market participants, the higher the efficiency is.  
An efficient market is characterized by a random walk model, applied to the 
security prices. A random walk model basically says future security prices could not be 
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determined by past prices. Thus, written in algebraic form, it is: 
 
,    where  represents the price series 
 
Because  is nonstationary, we cannot run model on  using the original form. So we 
run first differences of  and its lagged values, then the above equation becomes: 
 
,   where the coefficient for  would be zero. In other words, if the 
market follows a random walk, then current security returns do not predict future returns. 
Therefore, the key to comparing the market efficiency before and after the system is to 
compare the coefficients before and after the system, and see which one is closer to zero 
(and thus follows a random walk model). 
As suggested by Kaul and Sapp (2009), if a financial market is efficient, then 
security returns follows a random walk and its first-order autocorrelation should be zero. 
Accordingly, if the information incorporation is more efficient in the semi-transparent 
trading system, autocorrelation coefficient of exchange rate returns should be closer to 
zero. We use the following specification to test the hypothesis: 
 
 
 
The subscripts t and t-1 signify that it is a time series process. We pick quotes from our 
raw data set so that they are five minutes apart from each other, and use the resulting 
quotes as our series. In the first equation above, is spot exchange rate change, defined 
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as the first order difference of logarithm spot rate. EBS and F are system dummy and 
quote frequency respectively, so is the number of quotes in the t-th 5-minute 
interval. is a classical error item with variance of . The second equation is a GARCH 
(1,1) process to account for the time-varying second moment of exchange rate return. 
Unlike a typical GARCH (1,1) specification, we incorporate the lagged value of F 
because in our framework, quote frequency also has an impact on the variance of 
exchange rate return. 
There are four coefficients in the first equation. Coefficient measures the 
autocorrelation coefficient before the system was introduced. The system dummy EBS is 
included to compare the autocorrelations before and after the electronic system, and 
coefficient reflects such a difference. Autocorrelation of exchange rate return 
intuitively reflects over or under reaction of the exchange rate change to news. Increasing 
trading activity usually implies overreaction in the market. We use quote frequency to 
interact with the lagged returns to reflect this effect. Similar to general autocorrelation 
part, we also include a system dummy to examine the difference between the effects 
before and after the new system.  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. According to the table, the 
constant term is not statistically different from zero, which is consistent with the 
requirement of the random walk model. The coefficient is significantly negative, 
suggesting price reversal, a typical pattern for high frequency financial data. The 
coefficient of cross-product of system dummy and lagged return is found to be 
significantly positive, which implies that the semi-transparent system reduces exchange 
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rate return autocorrelation and brings it closer to zero. In other words, information 
efficiency is higher in the new system. The significantly positive implies over-reaction 
in the market when trading is more active. The negative  suggests that this over-
reaction decreases in the new trading system. Overall we can see that after the system 
was introduced, the autocorrelation for returns becomes closer to zero. This agrees with 
our expectation that the information efficiency increases when the new system facilitates 
easier information dissemination.  
  
4.2 Price Discovery Efficiency 
Flood et al. (1999) argue that due to higher search costs, informed dealers quote 
more aggressively in opaque market and quote transparency causes slower price 
discovery. Madhavan (1995) also suggests that participation of informed dealers might be 
deterred in a more transparent market because greater transparency reduces the effective 
amount of noise in the market, lowering market liquidity and making prices more 
sensitive to undisclosed liquidity trades. In Section 4.1, we show that semi-transparency 
increases price efficiency in the sense that it reduces under or over-reaction to the market 
news. However, it does not provide any insights into the concern about whether informed 
dealers might deter their quoting so that some private information might not be released 
as quickly as in the opaque market, causing slower information incorporation.  
According to the research mentioned above, big dealers who possess information 
advantage should quote more aggressively in the opaque market. Such aggressiveness can 
be measured by dealers’ contribution to the efficient price. We use the concept of 
information share, introduced by Hasbrouck (1995), to measure each group of dealers’ 
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relative contribution.  
Despite the fact that different dealers give different quotes, their quotes should be 
very close to each other, otherwise arbitrage behavior would eliminate any significant 
differences among the quotes. In this sense, dealer quotes are cointegrated. Price quotes 
of big dealers ( ) and small dealers ( ) can be written as:    
 
                                                    (4-1) 
where  is used in both equations because two prices are driven by the same implicit 
efficient price (Hasbrouck (2002)). Since price levels are I(1) processes, first order 
differences of price levels would be I(0) processes. According to the Wold Theorem, any 
variance stationary time series can be represented in the moving average form. Thus the 
moving average representation of  is given by: 
                                   (4-2) 
where  reflect the innovations in the two groups, and  are two-by-two 
matrices. This vector moving average (VMA) model can be simplified as the VECM 
format: 
                                   (4-3) 
where Pt=(P1t,P2t)’ is the two-group price series, α is the error correction vector, β is the 
cointegrating vector, and et consists of innovations. This equation is an elegant 
simplification of the VMA form and is easier to estimate. The first term on the right hand 
side represents the long-run equilibrium dynamics, whereas the second term represents 
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short-run frictions. The residuals term  is the innovations term in the quotes, which 
comprises two vectors of serially uncorrelated disturbances. 
  To calculate the information share of each group over a particular period, we pick 
estimated innovations in the target period, which has two columns (corresponding to 
two groups of price series), and calculate the covariance matrix of the innovations Ω: 
      (4-4) 
where  and  are innovation variances from the two groups, and  is covariance of 
innovations. Usually the covariance is not zero because there will always be some 
correlation between the two price series. In our example, we have big dealer and small 
dealer price series as the two groups, and there is hardly any justification that these two 
series should be totally uncorrelated. To eliminate the contemporaneous correlations, we 
employ a Choleski Decomposition on the covariance matrix:  
Ω=MM’                                                      (4-5) 
where  
Assuming that , then the information shares of the two price series in the 
target period are: 
                                   (4-6) 
                                   (4-7) 
Notice that S1 and S2 sum to 1. Intuitively, they give both groups’ percentage 
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contributions in the price discovery. If the theoretical hypothesis is true, informed (big) 
dealers’ information share should decrease after the electronic trading system.  
We use the same set of quote data and news data described before to conduct this 
test. We look at quotes from each trading day (weekdays) and pick quotes (mid of bid-ask 
prices) every five minutes from 8:00am to 20:00pm GMT daily. We pick these hours 
because European and North American markets are open during these hours and they 
usually have the most frequent trading activities and news releases on any given day. 
Quotes are picked from the big and the small dealers groups respectively, where big 
dealers are the top five dealers in terms of quoting frequencies for each month3.  
Before we start the estimation, we conduct a Johansen cointegration test on the 
big and small dealers’ quotes to confirm that they are cointegrated, with cointegrating 
vector (1,-1), a condition for the method to work. The results are positive. Then, 
following Sapp (2002), we use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), which takes into 
account heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations among innovations, to 
estimate equation (4-3) to obtain each group’s efficient price innovation ( ). The 
optimal number of lags in the equation above is determined through Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), and is found to be j=5.   
Recall that the purpose of this section is to test whether informed dealers would 
quote less aggressively and reveal less information in a more transparent market. Such a 
pattern, if true, should be most significant when information asymmetry is most severe 
(i.e. when big dealers have the most information advantages). Chen and Phylaktis (2009) 
show that big banks have private information advantage especially after major news is 
released. So we pick the period after major news release as our target period to test 
                                                        
3 Different thresholds will be tested later for robustness of the results. 
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information share change before and after the EBS was introduced.  
Again, following Almeida et al. (1998) and Anderson et al. (2007), we define 
various US and German macroeconomic news as significant news releases, and Table 3 
shows how many major news releases are included in our test. We focus on one hour 
after each significant news release to calculate information share by using equations (4-3) 
through (4-7). Note that we pick elements from vectors  that correspond to the hour 
after each significant news release, so we obtain information share values for the hour 
after each significant news release for each month. One hour window is picked because 
any period shorter than that might not have enough observations to calculate reliable 
information share4. Also, the one hour interval makes major news overlaps quite 
insignificant, i.e. most significant news release times are more than one hour from each 
other. This means that when calculating information shares, a certain quote will most 
likely only belong to one news group.  
We test the hypothesis that the information shares of big dealers calculated from 
these quotes should be smaller after the system was introduced. The information shares 
are computed for each news release. A simple paired t-test is conducted, and the results 
are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Big dealers’ information share in the new system is 
significantly lower than in the old opaque system at the 1% level. Figure 3 shows the 
average information share of each month, with the vertical axis being the information 
shares for big dealers for each month. The first 12 observations are before the electronic 
systems were introduced and subsequent observations are after the new system. 
Apparently, big dealers’ contribution to the efficient price decreases after the electronic 
trading system.  
                                                        
4 We will test different window periods longer than 1 hour later to check the robustness of our results.  
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In addition to major news releases, news arrival frequency is another indicator of 
information asymmetry. As shown in Chen and Phylaktis (2009), big dealers’ 
information share increases as more news arrive the market. If big dealers quote less 
aggressively in the electronic trading system, the increase of their information share 
should decrease. Thus, we have the second specification below: 
 
 
 
Information share in this test is calculated based on the quotes for each hour in every 
trading day. News arrival frequency is also counted based on the corresponding hour.  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficient of news arrival is 
found to be significantly positive, suggesting that big dealers do have more information 
advantage and make higher contribution to the price discovery when more news arrives 
to the market. Meanwhile, the significantly negative coefficient of interaction between 
news arrival and system dummy says that the increase in price contribution has decreased 
in the new trading system. This result, along with the result from the first information 
share test, suggests that the dealers with information advantage do quote less aggressively 
in the semi-transparent market, which supports the conclusions obtained in Flood et al. 
(1999) and Madhavan (1995).  
 
4.3 Robust Tests 
In the information efficiency test in Section 4.1, although the results are 
significant, it does not directly imply that the increase in information efficiency was 
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exactly due to the new system introduced in 10/1993. The EBS dummy variable may 
simply act as time dummy in an environment where information efficiency gradually 
increased due to other reasons. To address this concern, we conduct a robustness test by 
focusing on the months immediately before and after the system was introduced, and 
performing the same test using data from these months. If this test also returns significant 
results, it would indicate that the increasing information efficiency was indeed due to the 
abrupt system change in 10/1993. Because the system change actually started in 09/1993, 
we use data from 08/1993 and 11/1993 for this test. The results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 2. Again, all coefficients have the same respective signs with those obtained from 
the full sample test. The more negative coefficient for lagged return, combined with the 
more positive coefficient for system dummy interacting with lagged return, implies that 
even though price reversal is more severe when the sample covers months immediately 
before and after the EBS was introduced, the system reduces exchange rate return 
autocorrelation to a greater extent so as to bring it closer to zero (in fact, the net value -
0.1035 is closer than -0.1201, the net value under the full test). In other words, the effect 
is more apparent in this short term test. The same implication could be drawn from the 
other pair of coefficients. Overall, we can conclude that the new system contributed to an 
increase in information efficiency. 
In Section 4.2, we found significant evidence that information shares of big 
dealers decreased after the system was introduced. In fact, information share can be 
affected by two factors. First, how much information advantage the dealer has (i.e. degree 
of information asymmetry). Second, how much the dealer is willing to reveal her private 
information through her quotes. The decrease of big dealers’ information share detected 
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by our paper might also be caused by their loss in information advantage, thus the 
decrease in information share does not necessarily mean that big dealers are not willing to 
reveal this information in the semi-transparent market.  To address this concern, we show 
that big dealers did not lose their information advantage. The information advantage can 
be measured by a popular metric in market microstructure literature -- the Probability of 
Informed Trading (PIN). The PIN is calculated as the ratio of orders from informed 
traders to the total number of orders. Unlike many applications of the PIN where dealer 
IDs are unknown and the ratio needs to be estimated, we can explicitly identify informed 
dealers (usually big dealers) in our data so that each big dealer’s PIN can be directly 
approximated by their quote frequency over the total frequency. This ratio also reflects 
the actual market share the dealer has. As suggested by FX market microstructure studies 
such as Evans and Lyons (2002), private information is mainly conveyed through order 
flow that dealers receive. Thus, intuitively, the bigger transaction volume and market 
share the dealer has, the more information advantage the dealer has.  
Table 5 lists the top 10 dealers for the months before and after 10/1993 with their 
approximated market shares. It is evident from Table 5 that top banks before the EBS 
continue to be top banks after the introduction of EBS. In addition, the variation of top 5 
dealers’ monthly quotes ratios is shown in Figure 4. There is hardly any evidence that the 
ratios have changed over this period. In fact, they seem to have gone up a little. Therefore, 
Figure 4 and Table 5 together provide evidence that big dealers' composition and their 
sheer quoting activities have not changed significantly. This implies that if the 
information shares for big dealers decrease, it can only be the result of their intentional 
hiding of information. 
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In our original test, we define the top 5 banks as big dealers. Although this 
definition is not totally arbitrary and has empirical rationale, it is somewhat subjective. 
To test the robustness of our result with respect to this concern, we run the test again with 
different definitions of big dealers -- the top 10 and top 20 banks as big dealers, 
respectively. The results obtained from using the top 10 banks (reported in Table 4, Table 
6 and Figure 5) are very similar to the previous results. The t-test (Table 4) returns a 
significant, positive t-statistic, indicating that the monthly average information shares 
after significant news releases were higher before the system was introduced. In addition, 
the dummy coefficient, along with other coefficients, for the hourly information share test 
(Table 6) have the same sign and comparable magnitudes with those obtained when 
testing with top 5 banks as big dealers. 
The results for the top 20 banks (see Table 4, 6 and Figure 6) are different in that 
the dummy coefficient becomes positive, and so the information share values after the 
system was introduced are bigger than those before. This is actually not surprising 
because by switching from top 10 to top 20, we are adding a lot more banks and so the 
information share values for this group of big banks should increase. Also, by including 
more banks into our “big dealer” list, the distinction between the big dealers and small 
dealers becomes less substantial, as does their behavior. These results show that as the 
threshold for big dealers becomes lower, the effect diminishes, and even changes sign. 
We conclude that we can see significant decrease in information share values, and thus 
the intentional hiding of information, for dealers up to the top 10 banks.  
In the original test, we calculate the information share for the interval of 1-hour 
after major news release. The selection of 1-hour is also somewhat subjective. We test 
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robustness of our results by using different window periods – 1.5 hour and 2 hours. 
Results are reported in Table 4, 6 and Figure 7, 8. It is clear that the results are robust. 
Using different window periods paints the same picture as before: significant positive 
coefficient for news arrival, and significant negative coefficient for the interaction 
variable. This provides strong empirical support that within a reasonable time period after 
important news releases, big dealers do have information advantage, but they reveal less 
of their insider information after the system made the market more transparent.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of introducing the EBS on the foreign exchange 
market. The event transformed the market from being almost opaque to semi-transparent. 
The paper tries to answer whether this change has affected the market efficiency and if so, 
how different the effect is between informed (big) and uninformed (small) dealers. We 
tested informational efficiency and price discovery efficiency in order to answer this 
question. 
The paper finds that semi-transparency brought by the new system leads to an 
increase in information efficiency overall. However, informed dealers tend to reveal less 
information in the more transparent market, thus contributing less towards the efficient 
market prices. Several robustness tests are conducted, and the results agree with each 
other and confirm our conclusions. 
Prior to our study, the impact of electronic trading systems on the FX market had 
not been studied extensively. Even now, further research is necessary in several key areas. 
Although quoting frequency turns out to be a reliable proxy for volume in our tests, it is 
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still not as accurate as actual volume data. It would consequently be valuable if future 
studies retest our hypotheses with real volume data. With actual transaction data, future 
research can also test how different dealers’ monetary welfare change after the new 
system. Moreover, the current research is limited to the inter-dealer market, but it could 
be extended to the customer FX market. Such research could, for example, focus on 
internet trading, which is gaining popularity and changing the information structure in the 
customer market.  
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Table 1: Basic Statistics of Midquotes and 5-min Quote Frequency 
 
 Sample Size Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Midquotes 2622458 1.6613 0.0682 1.3895 1.7710 
Quote 
Frequency 93053 28.0338 24.8340 3 311 
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Table 2: Exchange Rate Return Autocorrelation Test 
 
This table reports the regression results of the equation: 
 
 
Numbers above the parentheses are estimated coefficients and numbers in the parentheses 
are the corresponding t-statistics. * indicates the coefficient is significant at 5% 
significance level. 
 
 #obs Constant Lagged return 
Lagged 
return*dummy 
Number of 
quotes*lagged 
return 
Number of 
quotes*Lagged 
return*dummy 
 
Panel A: full sample 
All 
dealer  96417 
-0.0000 
(0) 
-0.1951* 
(-34.15) 
0.0750* 
(68.47) 
0.0035* 
(132.29) 
-0.0031* 
(-10.33) 
 
Panel B: short term 
All 
dealer  11725 
0.0000 
(0) 
-0.3056* 
(-20.42) 
0.2021* 
(6.35) 
0.0069* 
(8.13) 
-0.0066* 
(-7.31) 
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Table 3: Number of Significant News Releases in Each Month 
  
Significant news are US and German macroeconomic news, including news related to 
GDP, interest rates, inflation, unemployment, income and spending, retail sales, durable 
goods sales, consumption, industrial production. The news data we use come from 
Reuters AAMM headline news. 
 
month 92/10 92/11 92/12 93/01 93/02 93/03 93/04 93/05 93/06 
frequency 57 56 36 62 43 61 61 62 105 
month 93/07 93/08 93/09 93/11 93/12 94/01 94/02 94/03 94/04 
frequency 57 41 74 97 128 155 108 154 163 
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Table 4: T-Test Results  
Top 5 dealers for every month in terms of the number of quotes given; same definition 
applies to other top dealers. * indicates the coefficient is significant at 5% significance 
level. 
 
 t-statistics Sample Size Implications of the results 
 
Panel A: different threshold for big dealers 
Top 5 Dealers 16.8966* 834 The information shares after 93/10 are smaller 
Top 10 Dealers 14.7921* 836 The information shares after 93/10 are smaller 
Top 20 Dealers -24.7063* 837 The information shares after 93/10 are bigger 
 
Panel B: different horizon for information share 
1.5 hours Window 
Period (top 5 
dealers) 
19.0277 * 834 The information shares after 93/10 are smaller 
2 hours Window 
Period (top 5 
dealers) 
19.1851 * 834 The information shares after 93/10 are smaller 
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Table 5: Dealers ranking with quote frequency ratio  
 
This table lists top 10 dealers based on monthly quote frequency. The corresponding 
ratios are each dealer’s quote frequency over total quote frequency, used as proxy for 
market share and PIN. 
Banks Ratios Banks Ratios Banks Ratios 
04/1993  05/1993  06/1993  
Deutsche Bank 0.0772 Deutsche Bank 0.0773 Deutsche Bank 0.0794 
BHF Bank 0.0647 Credit Suisse 0.0534 Chemical Bank 0.0463 
Credit Suisse 0.0589 Societe Generale 0.0448 Credit Suisse 0.0449 
Chemical Bank 0.049 Chemical Bank 0.0444 Societe Generale 0.0419 
Societe Generale 0.0466 BHF Bank 0.0436 BHF BANK 0.0416 
Rabobank Nederland 0.0409 Rabobank Nederland 0.0367 Lloyds Bank 0.0386 
Lloyds Bank 0.04 Lloyds Bank 0.0359 Rabobank Nederland 0.0386 
Dresdner Bank 0.0265 Amsterdam-Rotterdam  0.0355 Amsterdam-Rotterdam  0.0311 
Credit Lyonnais 0.0229 Barclays Bank 0.0268 Citibank 0.0272 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam  0.0222 Dresdner Bank 0.0264 Den Danske Bank 0.0237 
07/1993 08/1993 09/1993 
Deutsche Bank-Asia 0.0801 Deutsche Bank-Asia 0.0729 Deutsche Bank 0.0733 
BHF BANK 0.0662 BHF BANK 0.0572 Banque de l Union  0.0653 
Credit Suisse 0.0536 Rabobank Nederland 0.0515 BHF BANK 0.0595 
Chemical Bank 0.0411 Credit Suisse 0.0461 Rabobank Nederland 0.0527 
Rabobank Nederland 0.0371 Chemical Bank 0.0442 Societe Generale 0.049 
Lloyds Bank 0.0353 Lloyds Bank 0.0384 Credit Suisse 0.0475 
Credito Italiano 0.0323 Societe Generale 0.0379 Lloyds Bank 0.0433 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam  0.0283 Credito Italiano 0.0316 Chemical Bank 0.031 
Societe Generale 0.0276 Citibank 0.0266 Dresdner Bank 0.0289 
Dresdner Bank 0.0254 Dresdner Bank 0.0236 Den Norske Bank 0.0259 
11/1993 12/1993 01/1994 
CFCIC-UE 0.0928 DEUTSCHE Bank 0.1159 CFCIC-UE 0.0923 
DEUTSCHE Bank 0.0754 CFCIC-UE 0.087 DEUTSCHE BK 0.077 
SOC GENERALE 0.0659 SOC GENERALE 0.0826 RABOBANK 0.0743 
BHF Bank 0.0612 Rabobank 0.0747 SOC GENERALE 0.0737 
Rabobank 0.051 Barclays 0.0465 Credit Suisse 0.0586 
Credit Suisse 0.0389 BHF Bank 0.0344 Barclays 0.0312 
Barclays 0.027 Credit Suisse 0.0343 CREDITO 0.0294 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 0.0239 LLOYDS BANK 0.0289 BHF Bank 0.0275 
VUW Bank 0.0233 DEN NORSKE 0.0215 LLOYDS BANK 0.0237 
Chemical bank 0.0226 UBS 0.0214 UBS 0.0217 
02/1994 03/1994 04/1994 
DEUTSCHE BK 0.1211 DEUTSCHE BK 0.1002 CFCIC-UE 0.1336 
RABOBANK 0.0739 CFCIC-UE 0.0892 RABOBANK 0.1049 
CFCIC-UE 0.0618 SOC GENERALE 0.0753 SOC GENERALE 0.0448 
SOC GENERALE 0.0605 RABOBANK 0.0668 DEUTSCHE BK 0.0352 
Barclays 0.0385 CREDITO 0.0313 R Z B 0.0344 
CREDITO 0.0305 UBS 0.0302 ABN AMRO 0.0309 
LLOYDS BANK 0.0292 Barclays 0.0276 Barclays 0.0297 
R Z B 0.0247 R Z B 0.0251 CITIBANK 0.027 
UBS 0.0232 CITIBANK 0.0239 CREDITO 0.0235 
Chemical bank 0.0226 LLOYDS BANK 0.023 BHF Bank 0.0231 
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Table 6: Information Shares Versus News Arrival  
 
This table reports the regression results of 
equation  
Numbers above the parentheses are estimated coefficients and numbers in the 
parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics. Top 5 dealers every month in terms of 
the number of quotes given; same definition applies to other top dealers. * indicates 
the coefficient is significant at 5% significance level. 
 
 #obs Constant News arrival News arrival * system dummy R-squared 
Panel A: 
Top 5 dealers  3096 0.5396* (121.00) 
0.0014* 
(7.19) 
-0.0016* 
(-14.66) 
 
0.0652 
Top 10 dealers  3096 0.5140* (195.84) 
0.0009* 
(7.91) 
-0.0012* 
(-18.58) 
 
0.1021 
Top 20 dealers  3096 0.4761* (136.90) 
-0.0010* 
(-6.94) 
0.0020* 
(23.77) 
 
0.1657 
Panel B: 
1.5 hours 
Window 
Period (top 5 
dealers) 
2065 0.5578* (157.79) 
0.0005* 
(4.39) 
-0.0011* 
(-12.56) 
 
0.0736 
2 hours 
Window 
Period (top 5 
dealers) 
1549 0.5330* (70.87) 
0.0010* 
(6.39) 
-0.0009* 
(-12.07) 
 
0.1021 
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Figure 1: Midquote, Variance and Quote Frequency 
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Figure 2: Daily News Arrival Frequency 
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Figure 3: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares  
(1 Hour After News) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Big Dealers (top 5) Quote Ratios  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Figure 5: Big Dealers (top 10) Information Shares  
(1 Hour After News) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Big Dealers (top 20) Information Shares  
(1 Hour After News) 
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Figure 7: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares  
(1.5 Hour After News) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares  
(2 Hour After News) 
 
 
 
 
 
